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I agree with many of Professor Lea Brilmayer's criticisms of both Brainerd
Currie and the elaborators of his approach. At the same time, I think that her criticisms
may be considerably overstated to the extent that the upshot is that governmental
interest analysis is a house without foundations.
Clearly, as Professor Brilmayer seems to admit, what interest analysis is today
may be a very different thing from what it was intended to be when Currie first
formulated his foundational thesis in the late 1950's. As to the latter, a key question
is whether Currie's specific applications of his analysis evidenced merely an overly
simplistic approach to the problem of statutory construction (for illustrative purposes
or because of lack of a fully worked out theory of statutory interpretation), or, rather,
his methodology as applied intentionally masked certain value preferences. It appears
to me that Brilmayer's discussion fails to consider expressly both of these possibil-
ities. I tend to believe that the former was the case. Along this line, I should note that
while a theory of statutory interpretation can be formulated on the basis of certain
substantive policy preferences, it need not be.
Taking Currie's approach for what it expressly purported to be, its foundations
cannot possibly be deemed defective. On the contrary, at least outside the choice of
law area, few would question the fact that the initial responsibility of a court facing
a multistate case is exactly the same as that facing it in a purely domestic one: it must
ascertain whether the forum state legislature has directed it to apply a particular rule
of decision to the matter before it. An express or implied intent controls the court. An
actual intent in the sense that the legislature actually thought about the multistate case
need not be present for there to exist a general intent that requires application of a
statute outside the purely domestic context. Assuming no federal constitutional
limitations prevent the result, the application of a statutory rule even in the case of a
true conflict is, when such intent is reliably discoverable, demanded by separation of
powers principles. Conversely, if the forum legislature has intended the statutory rule
not to apply outside the domestic context, the forum court must obey. In this case,
however, it is not always true that the court must look for the applicable rule of
discussion in the domestic law of some other state.
In those cases in which the forum court cannot confidently determine the
extraterritorial intention of the enacting legislature, the forum court should do what
it does in a purely domestic case when the intention of the legislature is not clear: it
should assign an appropriate meaning to the statute. In the multistate case, the court
must consider not only the purpose of the domestic legislation, but also the interests
of other states, the expectations of the parties, system-coordinating needs and values,
and other relevant factors. Some of these considerations may be equally relevant in
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both the domestic and multistate case. This calculus may result in the conclusion that
the domestic statute should be construed to supply the rule of decision. On the other
hand, it may cause the court to narrow the statute to a purely domestic application.
The "moderate and restrained" interpretation step of the Currie analysis allows for
narrowing on the basis of at least some of the above mentioned factors.
Having said this, I must admit that I find it somewhat hard to explain Currie's
criticism of state legislatures for their adoption of territorialist dogma. There are,
however, several possible reasons for this criticism. Legislative adoption of the First
Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws approach in some statutes could be read
by the courts of the state as an implied statement to refrain from analysis of legislative
purpose with regard to other statutes when an examination might illuminate a purpose
that would require that the statute have extraterritorial application. Alternatively,
when a legislature expressly provides choice rules, it speaks to the generality of cases
and cannot possibly contemplate all the possible permutations of law and fact that
might arise in future multistate cases. Therefore, the application of the legislative
choice rules might in some cases substantially undermine the substantive purposes of
the domestic legislation. In other words, the courts, on a case-by-case basis in
multistate cases, are in the best position to ensure that the legislative purpose of the
substantive law is fully carried out, and not unnecessarily undercut by inflexible
choice rules.
When dealing with statutory construction, Currie used such terms as "policy,"
"purpose," and "intent" interchangeably on the apparent assumption that their
meanings were self-evident and the same. Clearly they are not. He, as well as courts
utilizing interest analysis, seems, in many instances, to use paraphrases of the
statutory rule as equivalent to "policy" or "purpose." This technique for determin-
ing extraterritorial reach is as conclusory and unhelpful as the reference in the married
women's article to the purpose of protecting "Massachusetts women."' Yet all this
does not suggest to me that Currie intended to use his methodology as a guise for
accomplishing some hidden agenda, but rather a relatively unthinking and unsophis-
ticated approach to policy analysis.
Much of Currie's analysis relied on issues where the legislature, rather than the
courts, had purported to lay down the rule of decision for purely domestic cases. Even
in Milliken v. Pratt,2 where the disability presumably was purely of common law
origin, Currie felt compelled to find legislative sanction for the contract disability. 3
Yet even outside the area where statutory directives control expressly or impliedly,
it still seems that Currie's basic premise that choice of law should be a matter of
construction and interpretation is basically sound. In purely domestic cases the court
determines whether a previously announced common law rule of decision should
apply to the case before it by determining whether the controversy is sufficiently
similar in relevant factors to previously decided cases purporting to stand for the rule
that the court, under an obligation to treat like cases in the same fashion, should apply
1. B. CURRIE, SE.umcD EssAys ON THE CoNfucr oF LAWS 85 (1963).
2. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
3. B. CURIE, supra note I, at 81.
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the rule to the new case. As Currie recognized, there is no reason why a court should
approach its task of deciding a multistate case in a different fashion. By definition,
in a multistate case the only factual difference from the purely domestic one is the
connection of various elements to other states than to the forum state. Thus, the
crucial inquiry is whether the extraterritorial nature of these connections justifies a
departure from the generally prevailing domestic rule. (I assume here that the forum
state may constitutionally prescribe the rule of decision.)
It certainly appears that if, for example, the common law rule was originally
designed for deterring certain conduct on the highways or providing compensation,
the facts that the accident occurred outside the state, or that the person seeking
recovery resides in the forum state, are very rational bases for a presumption either
against or in favor of forum law. At the same time, the fact that the originally
envisioned purpose might not be served by application of the rule in the multistate
case does not necessarily mean that the court cannot decide for the first time in the
multistate case that the rule should serve other purposes that suggest its application
to the case at bar. For example, in the case of a rule of the road originally designed
for deterrence within the forum, the court might defensibly conclude that when it
comes to its citizens they should be just as careful outside of the state borders where
the citizens might injure nonresidents. Of course, any such determinations are subject
to federal constitutional limitations, as Professor Brilmayer suggests. 4 However, as
long as the state court acts within these limitations in formulating a purpose for the
rule, it is not irrational or indefensible for a state court to so extend its rule. Unlike
the instance when the court is dealing with a forum statute in which the purpose may
be imparted by the legislature whose will is supreme, in the common law areas, the
court can decide in each case what purpose or purposes should be served by the rule
even though the purposes as formulated suggest extraterritorial application. It is true,
therefore, that the conclusion that the purposes of a common law rule demand its
application to a multistate case is much more of a creative function than Currie
expressly seemed to envision. I am still not convinced that any failure to acknowledge
this was due to design on his part, but rather due to his failure to think through his
basic premises to their logical conclusion.
In short, interest analysis as originally formulated gives no guidance as to why
a statutory or common law rule should be seen as extending to multistate cases.
However, this does not establish that its foundations are faulty because the logical
implication of interest analysis is that courts perform alike in domestic and multistate
cases. Any theory proposed to tell a court how to substantively decide a case,
domestic or multistate, must be normative in orientation. In contrast, the basic
insights of interest analysis relate not to results, but to how to approach a multistate
case. To the extent Currie and his followers did have substantive views as to how far
rules should extend, they were merely expressing (though perhaps unwittingly) the
type of judgments that courts of necessity must express in the common law area, both
4. Brilmayer, Government Interest Analysis: A House without Foundations, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 459, 473 (1985).
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in the domestic and multistate context, when they discard the vested rights and First
Restatement mythologies.
Most importantly, in determining similarity of cases, the court is concerned with
more than the purpose of the rules at issue. In arriving at the parameters of the rule
as applied in purely domestic cases, the court is obviously engaged in a more or less
complicated balancing of what it believes to be the relevant considerations. The
extraterritorial connections may trigger other and perhaps different considerations
which may alter this balance. The interests of other states, interstate interests, party
expectations, and other factors are relevant in the multistate case. Thus, the rule
applied to the multistate case may differ from that applied to the purely domestic case
and even from the rules of all other potentially interested jurisdictions. To the extent
that Currie denigrated the balancing of interests, he was guilty of failing to accept the
logical result of his insight that the court in the multistate case must proceed in the
manner of one facing a purely domestic situation. In fact, as long as the forum court
is dealing with a case within the constitutional legislative jurisdiction of the state, it
can fashion any rule it sees fit as long as it does not violate equal protection,
procedural or substantive due process restrictions, or other constitutional limitations
on choice of law. The policies sought to be advanced by the rules of other potentially
interested states are merely data for the creative process of fashioning the most
suitable rule for the case at hand. Since the forum court is the lawmaker with ultimate
authority absent legislative veto, it certainly is just as competent and under just as
much an obligation to come up with the best rule of decision as when it faces a purely
domestic case. The inquiry should not be which is the better rule but which is the best
rule.
Finally, I believe that the "restrained and moderate ' 5 interpretation step of the
Currie analysis allows for some, but not all, of the relevant considerations applicable
to a multistate case to be taken into account. It is difficult to tell for sure because of
Currie's lack of exact delineation of how this process was to occur.
Thus, I would conclude that Professor Brilmayer is correct in stating that the
ultimate irony of policy analysis of choice of law is that choice decisions are not
conceived of as policy decisions. 6 At the same time, the foundational concept of
construction and interpretation represents an indisputably accurate description of what
courts can and should do in determining what rule of decision to apply to a multistate
case. Currie's problem, as I have said, was his shortsighted failure to follow his
premises to their logical conclusions.
It seems to me that any assertion that interest analysis is fundamentally unsound
requires establishment that the general process of decision in domestic and multistate
cases should differ in significant ways. I simply do not think that Professor Brilmay-
er's critique does this.
5. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & Co.mtp. PRoHs. 754, 757 (1963).
6. Brilmayer, supra note 4, at 480.
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